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This paper is about what it feels like to participate in a transdisciplinary project between the social, 
human and life sciences.  ‘Transdisciplinary ? and  ‘interdisciplinary ? research-modes have been the 
subject of much attention lately  ? especially as they cross boundaries between the social/humanistic 
and natural sciences. However, there has been less attention, from within STS, to what it is actually 
like to participate in such a research-space. This paper contributes to that literature through an 
empirical reflection on the progress of one collaborative and transdisciplinary project: a novel 
experiment in neuroscientific lie detection, entangling STS, literary studies, sociology, anthropology, 
clinical psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Its central argument is two-fold: (1) that, in addition 
to ideal-type tropes of transdisciplinary conciliation or integration, such projects may also be 
organized around some more subterranean logics of ambivalence, reserve and critique; (2) that an 
account of the mundane ressentiment of collaboration allows for a more careful attention to the 
ĂǁŬǁĂƌĚ ĨŽƌŵƐŽĨ  ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂǇ ĨůŽǁ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚĞĞĚƉƌŽƉĞů ?ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞ
work more broadly. Building on these claims, the paper concludes with a suggestion that such 
subterranean logics may be indissociable from some forms of collaboration, and it proposes an ethic 











 The desire to work between disciplines is an emerging feature of the contemporary academy. The 
trend towards the dissolution of boundaries between different ways of producing knowledge can be 
seen in a variety of sites, including novel degree programmes (Worton, 2013), genre-busting research-
management strategies (European Science Foundation, 2013), and centres and objects of research 
(Hadorn et al., 2008). For scholars within Science and Technology Studies (STS), such hybrid research 
projects have particular salience. Not only has STS scholarship developed tacit expertise that crosses 
different disciplinary knowledges (Collins and Evans, 2002), but also the very production and 
sustenance of disciplined knowledge-objects has itself been a longstanding interest within these 
literatures (Gieryn, 1983; Star and Griesemer, 1989). Moreover, having been trained to identify the 
ŐĂƉƐĂŶĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?^d^ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐĂƌĞǁĞůů placed to actually 
work within and through interdisciplinary research projects (Jasanoff, 2011). Unsurprisingly then, as 
interdisciplinarity has emerged as a potent rhetoric of contemporary knowledge production and as a 
way of enacting a hybridized STS knowledge, sustained attention to the collaborative logic of 
interdisciplinarity has appeared within STS (Gorman, 2010; Maasen, 2000; Rabinow and Bennett, 
2012) and cognate literatures (Frodeman et al., 2010; Schmidt, 2007).  
This paper reflects on the progress of one collaborative and transdisciplinary project, a novel 
experiment in neuroscientific lie detection, in which the authors of this paper, who are from different 
disciplinary backgrounds  ? STS, literary studies, sociology, anthropology, clinical psychology, and 
cognitive neuroscience  ? were entangled. There are still relatively few accounts (Rabinow and 
Bennett, 2012, discussed just below, is an exception) of what it is actually like, in the most basic sense, 
to participate in such collaborations, and even fewer analyses of the broader logics of collaboration 
that root themselves in such experiences, or in the feelings engendered through them. This is 
potentially significant. The humanities and social science authors on this paper, for example, entered 
the collaboration with ideal-type accounts of the logic of cross-disciplinary labour, based on notions 
of trade (Galison, 1997), interaction (Collins and Evans, 2002), and integration (Huutoniemi et al., 
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2010). And yet these accounts did not serve the group at all well when they encountered the more 
mundane realities of actually producing knowledge within a collaborative and transdisciplinary 
research space. In preparing this reflective paper, which tries to re-focus attention away from the ideal 
and the abstract, and towards the mundane and the tangible, we have come to the realization that 
the mundane pragmatics of this collaboration were not so much guided by logics of collaboration, 
shared interest, and mutual enrichment; that they took place, in fact, within a rather less transparent, 
rather less unified, and rather less propitious sphere of interaction and exchange  ? a  field that was 
dominated, instead, by some more subterranean feelings of ambivalence, critique, reserve, and even 
dishonesty. This paper is thus an attempt to unfold the consequences of a realization that 
collaboration is sometimes not so much about dialogue or trade; that it can also be a much more 
ambiguous intertwinement of knowledge, affect, and power. 
 In their Designing Human Practices (2012), an account of a similarly collaborative effort within 
the emerging field of synthetic biology, the ethnographer-collaborators Paul Rabinow and Gaymon 
Bennett describe their interaction with molecular scientists aƐ  ‘ĂƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
ŶĚ ǇĞƚ ? ĂƐ ǁŝƚŚ ŽƵƌ ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƐƵĐŚ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ŵĞĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ ZĂďŝŶŽǁ ĂŶĚ ĞŶŶĞƚƚ ?Ɛ
experimental experience was an unending joy. Indeed, reflecting on an experience that produced 
some acrimony, the ethnographers go on to explore, at some length, their scientific collaborators' 
 ‘ǁŝĚĞ-ƌĂŶŐŝŶŐ ůĂĐŬ ŽĨ ĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƚŝĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂŐƌĞĞĚ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐǁĞƌĞ ?ŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ƌĂƌĞůǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇĂŶĚ ?ĞĂƐŝůǇŶĞŐůĞĐƚĞĚ ?ǁŚĞŶŝƚ ?came] to 
ƚŚĞŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐŝŶďŝŽƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ ? ?pp. 4, 7). They describe how their 
social-science questions were frequently mĞƚ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ƉĞƌƉůĞǆŝƚǇ ? ŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ?Žƌ ŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ĨƌŽŵ
their bioscientist colleagues, and they show how they sometimes even experienced 'active resistance' 
to their research priorities (pp. 8, 20). Amid this 'hierarchy of power and privilege,' they point out, it 
was taken as natural that Rabinow and Bennett 'were conversant with the molecular biology and eager 
to learn more'  ? whereas, on the part of the molecular biologists themselves, 'no reciprocity emerged, 
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nor was it encouraged' (p. 29). As we will show below (but we will depart markedly from Rabinow and 
ĞŶŶĞƚƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ƚhis sense of discomfiture resonates with our experience. 
In an account of ethnography and collaboration at Xerox Park, and drawing on Barry et al. ?Ɛ
 ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨĂŵŽƌĞ ‘ĂŐŽŶŝƐƚŝĐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌity, Lucy Suchman asks ? ‘ǁŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚŝƚŵĞĂŶ ?ƚŽ
treat [such ?ƌĞƐŽŶĂŶĐĞƐĂŶĚƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐĂƐƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ?2013: 156). This paper provides one answer. Its 
core argument is that attending to these experiences opens up a more expansive and compelling space 
for theorizing interdisciplinary work; more specifically, by reflecting on the mundane everyday of 
collaboration, and on the feelings and senses of ressentiment1 entangled in it, it argues that we might 
more fruitfully explore ƚŚĞ ĂǁŬǁĂƌĚ ĨŽƌŵƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ƚŚĂƚsometimes animate 
collaborations like this one. Thus, in the first section, we describe the experiment in question, and our 
reasons and methods for approaching it. In the second, we reflect on what it was like to participate in 
this experiment, focusing on the presence of three unanticipated collaborative registers in our project: 
ambivalence, critique, and dishonesty. The third and fourth sections argue that these feelings might 
be interpreted as effects of the epistemological politics of collaboration, and here we attempt a more 
generalized account of the relationship between politics and experiment in such collaborations. In the 
conclusion, reflecting on the ambiguous, shifting and perhaps intractable nature of such a politics, we 
do not call for more genial or transparent modes of collaboration but for more attention to 
equivocation as a way to live with, and to work through, such modes of collaborative exchange. 
It should be noted that when we reflect on our experience, the feelings and intentions 
reflected upon are not always admirable, nor are they flattering to the authors. But our commitment 
here is not to judge the moral content of our experience. The ƉĂƉĞƌ ?Ɛaim, instead, is to unfold the 
roles played by some less savoury feelings and motivations in our collaboration, and to bring these 
into understanding within a wider attention to interdisciplinary work. Setting aside the desire for a 
normative or practice-based account of this experience, we explore how such feelings might actually 
underpin a collaboration, one, indeed, that might otherwise ďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ? ?ŽƌĞǀĞŶ




The experiment in question 
The experiment at the heart of this paper came from Ă  ?EĞƵƌŽ^ĐŚŽŽů ?ŽŶ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ
neuroimaging ?, run by the European Neuroscience and Society Network (ENSN).2 Despite its name, 
the NeuroSchool was not designed as a straightforwardly pedagogical institution. Its goal was to look 
for more complex interactions between the neural and social sciences, not only by promoting cross-
disciplinary knowledge-sharing, but by requiring attendees to think with and through the perspective 
of another science. As such, the programme declared:  
Training in the neurosciences is very often ahistorical and asocial... [whereas] students 
trained in the social studies of neuroscience do not always have a chance to be directly 
exposed to how rationales and questions in neuroscience experimentation are 
formulated. (ENSN, 2009) 
The goal was not simply to pool neuroscientific and social-scientific expertise, but was to generate a 
space in which neuroscientists and social scientists might work together to conceptualize a 
neuroscience embedded in its own culture and history, as well as a social world worked through the 
structures and functions of the human brain. 
The ENSN attempted to generate an infrastructure for scholars to think and collaborate in the 
space between a burgeoning neuro-discourse and the wide-open field of related ethical and social 
issues. In an era that did not lack for neuroscientists thinking about the societal consequences of their 
work (Iacoboni, 2008), or for social scientists keen to talk about the cultural a prioris of neurobiological 
knowledge (Martin, 2005), the ENSN was distinguished by its attempt to locate a specifically 
transdisciplinary space between neuro-biological and sociological interests: 
 ‘transdisciplinarity', unlike interdisciplinarity, does not simply mean laying two or 
more disciplines next to each other. Rather, it means to set about a question 
simultaneously taking into account visions and methods on the same topic from 
seemingly different perspectives. (ENSN, 2007)  
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Participants at the NeuroSchool not only exchanged ideas on social neuroscience and the role of 
neuroimaging technology; they also formed into teams to collaborate on the design of neuroimaging 
experiments that were expected to grant intellectual parity to the role of social context. The team that 
designed the most engaging proposal was invited to carry out their experiment at the Centre for 
Integrative Neuroscience, in Aarhus, Denmark. The design that became the experiment at the heart 
of this paper was the winning proposal.3  
What united many of the participants at the NeuroSchool  ? and certainly the authors on this 
paper  ? was an inchoate sense that there was ground to be claimed by pushing at the edges of an 
ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶƚ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?  ?Ğ ?Ő ?, Lieberman, 2006). The transdisciplinary goal of both the 
workshop, and the present authors, was to ask if ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ Ă  ‘ŵŽƌĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ? ƐŽĐŝĂů
neuroscience could help us, in turn, to reimagine forms of engagement across the biological and social 
sciences. Participants worked together, as in an interdisciplinary model,  but in addition they tried to 
reimagine (however partially) some of the fundamental questions and assumptions of the  ‘other ?
disciplines (see Thompson Klein [2010] for a careful parsing of forms of inter- and trans-disciplinarity).4 
Thus, the ostensible and public shared normative commitments both of the members of this 
collaboration, and of the NeuroSchool in general, were not so much to the critique of neuroscience as 
such, but to the emergence of a more expansive, transdiscplinary, (especially) social neuroscience, 
one that maintained a commitment to the rigours of experimental practice but that was also mindful 
of the ƉůƵƌĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽ ?  ‘ƚŚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ?. In addition to its 
ostensible goal, therefore, ƚŚĞ ‘ǁŝŶŶŝŶŐ ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůwould also be an experiment in collaboration itself. 
How would a truly transdisciplinary engagement between sociological and biological knowledge 
actually play out, in practice? This was a question that animated the NeuroSchool and our 
collaborative group.  
It is worth noting that the methodology of this larger experiment in transdisciplinarity was ad 
hoc and informal. The groups were formed seemingly only with an eye to disciplinary spread; there 
was no obvious processes for on-going assessment or mediation (beyond the competition), nor did 
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there seem to be an accounting for the quality and process of collaboration. We note this not as a 
critique of the ENSN, but to stress that virtually all of our group ?s design energy went into the 
neuroimaging experiment, rather than to the formation of our own interaction. This meant that we 
lacked an explicit method or forum for addressing and recounting the kinds of feelings that we 
describe in this paper, or for associating them with particular moments or issues in the collaboration. 
Our collective experience is that informality and ad hoc procedures are more common than not in 
interdisciplinary assemblages; thus, there was ĂƐĞƌĞŶĚŝƉŝƚŽƵƐ ‘ĞĐŽůŽŐŝĐĂůǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ? both to ƚŚĞE^E ?Ɛ
procedure, as well as to the experiment that followed. We note also that this collaboration worked. 
Despite some apparently unusual features, and the ambivalence that at least partly resulted from 
them, we produced a finding worthy of submitting to a peer-reviewed journal. We will reflect more 
ŽŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ lack of specificity in our 
procedures in the conclusion. 
 KƵƌ ŐƌŽƵƉ ?Ɛ experimental design centred on neuroimaging studies of lie detection 
(Langleben et al., 2005; Wolpe et al., 2010). While attempts to produce a scientific basis of lie 
detection have a long history, several scholars from within the neurosciences have recently 
wondered if the brain-imaging method, fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging), might not 
finally provide a method for reliably locating valid acts of deception within the body and brain of an 
individual. However, historical and cultural critics of lie detection  ? including Littlefield (2009, 2011) 
 ? had drawn attention to the way in which such an endeavour recapitulated some of the most basic 
and problematic aspects of previous attempts at scientific lie detection. These included the 
assumption that  ‘truth ? and  ‘lie ? ĂƌĞ, if not natural categories, robust kinds with solid biological 
correlates; they also included the tacit suggestion that deception, as an embodied phenomenon, 
might be understood as a departure from a biological norm; that truth, therefore, could be positioned 
as the natural condition of the body at rest. The experiment attempted to transform this 
fundamentally sociological and historical critique into a meaningful collaboration, and thus to 
rearticulate a well-established socio-critique through the very methods and assumptions of 
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neuroimaging itself. Could we collaborate across epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina, 1999) while 
designing a more reflexive experiment in fMRI lie detection, one that would have regard for the rigour 
and robustness of neuroscientific experiment, but that would also reflexively integrate social and 
cultural questions into its basic paradigm?  
There is not space here for a formal account (see Littlefield et al. under review), but the 
experiment drew on an expansive historical and literary tradition to argue that truth and lie might 
not be so distinctive as the neuroimaging literature assumes (we alighted on lie detection, 
particularly, because it was a literature with which the group, via Littlefield, had some prior 
expertise). The core goal of the experimental design was to generate ĂŶ ‘ĞĐŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
Ă  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůůǇ-ƐƚƌĞƐƐĨƵů ?truth would be operationalized. In the final experiment, we recruited 27 
participants from choirs in Aarhus, told them we were running a brain-imaging study on team 
evaluation in the context of a competitive environment, and invited them to a day-long series of 
choir-based team-building activities, culminating in a team singing competition. 5  On arrival, 
participants were randomly split into two teams, which were to individually bond, compete with one 
another, and practice singing together as separate teams, until a final singing competition. During 
the day, each participant was individually led to a separate room, and asked to record a short video, 
singing solo to a camera. They were told that when they each came for their subsequent individual 
fMRI scan, they would evaluate four randomly selected videos. It was stressed ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇ ?ŽĨ
their responses would contribute to an overall team score and would be revealed at an unspecified 
future date, when everyone would get together again, and all results be revealed.  
What the participants did not know, however, was that each team contained two actors, one 
female and one male, who were working with the experimenters. The actors had two core 
instructions: (1) to play the role of a very likeable, outgoing member of their team; and (2) to sing 
very, very badly. Of course, wŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞĂů ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐwere taken to record their solo videos, 
nothing was recorded; only the actors made (deliberately awful) videos. And when participants came 
for their brain-imaging appointment, we fixed it so that everyone could only select the names of the 
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four actors. The point of all this subterfuge was to get the participants to tell an awkward truth about 
the terrible performance of a member of their own team, when that person was particularly likeable, 
and when they had just spent a day bonding, and when this would be made public to the teammate 
in the future 6  ? and also ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇŽĨĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ?ƐũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ was very much at stake. We 
defined this  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůůy-ƐƚƌĞƐƐĨƵůƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĂƐ a truth elicited from participants, in the fMRI scanner, under 
conditions that render the teller unsure, or slightly ambivalent, or particularly attentive, or self-
aware. We hypothesized that the cognitive activity involved in the socially-stressful truth would belie 
the use of truth as a baseline condition in deception studies, showing truth-telling as a complex, 
costly, and sometimes awkward activity in its own right. And indeed we found that truth, no less than 
lying, showed activity in areas associated with mentalizing, empathy, attention, decision-making, and 
so on. Thus, we tried to use humanistic knowledge to expand and problematize this area of 
neuroscience by using the language and methods of neuroimaging itself.   
 As novices in this kind of project we were well versed in 'ideal-type' accounts of cross-
disciplinary interaction and collaboration (Aboelala et al., 2007; Collins and Evans, 2002; ESF, 2013; 
Nissani, 1997), as well as long-standing STS theories of boundary-working and boundary-crossing in 
scientific spaces (Gieryn, 1983; Star and Griesemer, 1989). This is a valuable corpus on how 
collaboration can or should be done i.e., with transparency, clarity, and a productive outcome; it sets 
out the instrumental justifications for pursuing these forms of collaboration, and the gains to be 
made through them; and it begins to characterize some of the forms of knowledge and action (both 
tacit and explicit) that might actually allow researchers to talk across borders.  
But the truth is that we simply do not recognize our own collaboration in such descriptions. 
And we are increasingly convinced that these accounts are too conciliatory and too instrumental. In 
short, they are too distant from our own, more contrary, experience of working across similar 
boundaries. Our goal in what follows is to expand these accounts of collaboration and to call for more 
attention to the intensely ambivalent, transgressive and affective qualities of epistemic boundary-
crossing. Our gambit is twofold: (1) that the ressentiment that characterizes much of the experience 
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described here is not unique, or even terribly unusual, despite its low prominence in a literature that 
tilts towards encouragement; and (2) that if we wish to understand possible registers of collaboration 
more widely, we need some account of the presence of negative feelings in these spaces, and, 
perhaps more importantly, an understanding of the relationship of such feelings to experimental 
outcomes. The remainder of this paper is an attempt to work through this initial gambit. In the next 
section, we reflect on the unspoken tensions and lurking resentments that may haunt the space of 
some contemporary collaboration, but whose role, up to now, has not been fully elaborated. In the 
following section, we elaborate on the politics of experiment demanded by this reflection, and we 
ask what such an attention might tell us about collaboration at the broader scale.  
 
Ambivalence, critique and dishonesty in collaborative practice 
Ambivalent traders 
It seems intuitively obvious that some kind of shared interest would lie at the at the heart of any 
successful collaboration. In their discussion of how interdisciplinary work might be assessed, 
Huutoniemi and her colleagues (2010) argue that  ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶďŽŶĚƐŚĂƌĞĚďǇŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
is the need to combine knowledge resources in order to develop an integrated product, either a 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ?ŽƌĂƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?p. 313). Similarly, Chiao (2009) suggests 
that,  ‘ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ? tools enables unprecedented ability to investigate the mutual 
constitution of genes, brain, mind, and culture  ? ŚĞŶĐĞƚŚĞŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĐŽŶũŽŝŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?p. 291).  In 
opposition to a well-motivated  ‘ĐŽŶũŽŝŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?however, our collaboration was characterized by a sort 
of ongoing and collective ambivalence. In particular, and throughout the project, several of the 
experimenters maintained a decidedly fuzzy attitude to their own goals and desires. For Fitzgerald, 
for example, motivations for collaboration swung radically back and forth between a desire to 
undermine some aspect of neuroscience in some way, and a countervailing desire to provoke a 
complacently interpretive social science. But precisely not clarifying this issue, and thus never 
committing or resolving it either way, was a constant feature of &ŝƚǌŐĞƌĂůĚ ?Ɛ ongoing participation in 
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the project. For Littlefield, the opportunity to work with a brain-scanner was intertwined with a 
different series of unvoiced ambivalences: how could the project be fully collaborative when only 
one member of the group knew how to collect and analyze fMRI data? For example, when the group 
presented its original idea during an intensive laboratory meeting in Aarhus, the design began to 
change rapidly and significantly, as local attendees chipped in from the floor: suddenly the 
experiment needed gender balance among the actors, it needed a popular Danish activity (choir 
singing, as it turned out), it needed a head coil, it needed visual versus auditory questions and so on. 
Especially for the social scientists and humanists, the steam-roller effect of these suggestions left 
them feeling very much out of their depth, concerned that the experiment was getting too far from 
the original intentions, but also feeling quite unprepared and under-qualified to intervene in the 
rapid-fire workshop format. As the design changed, so did a gap emerge between the original idea 
and the actual experiment  ? so too, and not least for Littlefield, did an ambivalence form around 
whether that actual experiment lived up to the expectations of the idea, or whether the final design 
was ultimately ĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐĂŬĞ ? 
But what is perhaps most retrospectively striking is that the group, which had been 
assembled around this experiment in brain imaging, and which shared a loose desire for some more 
potent claim on the space between neuroscience and the social, never actually discussed the range 
of ambivalences gathered under this loose unity. Littlefield kept the above ambivalences to herself, 
for example  ? with the effect that the experimental design shifted significantly from the original idea 
(which was hers). It is notable that while some members of this collaboration (Tonks, Dietz) were 
more-or-less confident in the ability of the MRI scanner to reveal something truthful about brain 
function, others (Fitzgerald, Littlefield) were fairly committed to a view that imaging neuroscience 
was vastly overhyped, that confidence in its procedures was the product of a widespread 
epistemological naivety, and that as a cultural and academic force, its growing power was not always 
a good thing (Choudhury et al., 2009; Vidal, 2010). Across this divide, the shared interest remained 
decidedly unclear.  
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Collaborations are often characterized ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐ ŽĨ  ‘ƚƌĂĚĞ ?  ?ŽůůŝŶs et al., 2007; 
Galison, 1997 ? ?'ĂůŝƐŽŶ ?Ɛ(1997) ŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝŶŐǌŽŶĞƐ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂůƐ a way of 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ ĂĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚǁŽŽƌ ŵŽƌĞ ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ŵŝŐŚƚ  ‘ĂŐƌĞĞŽŶ ƌƵůĞƐŽĨ
exchange even if they ascribe utterly different significance to the things being exchanged  ? trading 
partners can hammer out a local coordination despite vast global ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ? ?p. 783). Galison (1997) 
ŝŶǀŽŬĞƐĂŶĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚƌĂĚĞƚŽƐƚƌĞƐƐƚŚĂƚĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ĞǀĞŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƚǁŽ
vastly different symbolic and cultural systems  ? between which not even the significance of the 
objects of trade is agreed-upon ? (p.  ? ? ? ? ?dŚƵƐ ?ŝŶ'ĂůŝƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŶŽƚĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ
on a banal and homogenizing agreement. It may, in fact, be an edgy, temporary, and local procedure 
(Galison, 1997: 805-6). While this rubric can account for collective diversity, it seems less able to 
explain individual ambivalences. Whatever their different starting points, as Galison (1996: 151) 
reminds us elsewhere, each participant in the development of a successful collaboration  ‘ŚĂƐĂǀŝĞǁ ?.
In this collaboration, ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ?ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŝĞƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂmuch less easily identifiable zone 
of exchangeable views around the object (cf. Calvert, 2010) ? ZĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ůŽĐĂů
ĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚĞŶĂďůĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŬŝŶĚƐŽĨ ?ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ?epistemic transaction, we did not 
talk about, resolve, or actually even share our differences and our ambiguities (Galison, 1997: 830). 
Knudsen, for example, ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ, was beset throughout the project by ill-
defined feelings that despite being interested in the internalization of culture at the neurological 
level, he was unsure, as an anthropologist, how to contribute to a study whose purpose and validity 
were entangled in methods about which he knew little. Moreover, and given that participants would 
be in a team-building environment, fostering connections with others, Knudsen considered some of 
the broader social consequences from an anthropological angle. What if, having partaken in a staged 
social interaction, participants fostered friendships with the in-character actors? Indeed, this 
happened during a team-bonding dinner, when a participant wanted to swap contact information. 
Such moments gave Knudsen pause to consider how he had at least partially subordinated his 
anthropological instincts to the exigencies of the experiment But Knudsen never fully resolved these 
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feelings, let alone talked about them, or rationalized or traded them through a local configuration. 
The effect of this was that Knudsen stayed attached to the experiment by dwelling in this space of 
ambivalence, even if he remained at times uncertain of what he was doing there, what his interest 
was, or what this integrative project was actually doing for him.        
 This also helps us to understand how the collaboration did not fall apart. In one sense, of 
course, winning the competition, and having the rare opportunity to follow-through with an 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝƚƐŽǁŶƉƌŽƉƵůƐŝǀĞĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ ?ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůmotivations. But 
in interpreting the persistence of the process, we also draw attention to the dominance of 
ambivalence over either enthusiasm or despondency. Rheinberger (2011) has shown that 
experiments often make space for rather more digression, novelty, and serendipity, than is 
sometimes imagined. It strikes us, similarly, that the persistence and coherence of our experiment 
was not necessarily troubled by the fact that  the experimenters often remained suspended between 
different motivations and feelings. Thus we draw attention to the fact that collaboration sometimes 
proceeds precisely because individuals do not ŚĂǀĞĂĨŝǆĞĚŝĚĞĂŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞ, or of 
what the own view is. There remains a persistent idea that transdisciplinary scholars should be 
masters of their own domain, that they must enter collaboration knowing who they are, what they 
have to offer, and what they want to achieve (Bruce et al., 2004; Lyall and Meagher, 2012). Our 
collaboration was rooted in precisely the opposite strategy. We kept things vague. 
 
Undercover critics 
There is not yet an account of collaboration in which researchers interact with another epistemic 
culture with some sense that they want to deflate at least one part of it. For several of the 
experimenters who were part of this project, collaborating with neuroscientists was a way to re-
articulate an already-existing critique of fMRI lie detection from the heart of the field itself. There 
were, of course, already convincing and cogently-articulated reasons to be wary of fMRI lie-detection 
in particular, and of the biologization of deception in general (Bunn, 2012; Littlefield, 2011). What the 
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collaboration achieved, in the end, was a more  ‘subversive ? re-articulation of a point that had more-
or-less already been made.  
This tacitly subversive goal of the research became explicit when one participant, having been 
told the true purpose of the experiment during the debriefing, ŵŝƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĞƌƐ ?
intent, called his research contact later that day, and asked that his data not be used; due to political 
and ethical concerns, he explained, he did not want to contribute to the creation of a neuroscientific 
lie detector. 7 We immediately agreed to remove the participant ?s data, but we asked him to come 
and speak to us in person again anyway. When he did, we were at great pains to re-emphasize that 
our research was precisely about making it harder to make such a lie detector. Relieved, and even 
enthused, the participant withdrew his request.  
This places our project at odds with most of the literature on transdisciplinary neuroscience. 
dŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƐŝŐŚƚŽĨ ‘ŶĞƵƌŽĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ? ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽƵƌďƌĂŝŶĂŶĚŶĞƌǀŽƵƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ
ĂƌĞ ŽƵƌ ŵŽƐƚ ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ŽƌŐĂŶƐ ?  ?>ĞŶĚĞ ĂŶĚ owney, 2012: 23). Calling for an approach that can 
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌ ? ‘ƉƵďůŝĐƐǇŵďŽů ?ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇĞŶĚŽǁŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐĂĨĨŽůĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
ŶĞƵƌŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?one of the core tenets of neuranthropology is that neural activity cannot 
be well understood without a detailed and nuanced understanding of the cultural environment in 
which a given brain was sculpted, while cultural knowledge is only half understood if we do not follow 
its effects, repercussions, and re-articulations through the central nervous system (Lende and 
Downey, 2012: 23-24). But the ŵŽĚĞůŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƌĞŵĂŝŶƐŽŶĞŽĨ ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƐŚŝƉ ? ?ĂŶĚŽĨ ‘ƐŚĂƌ ?ŝŶŐ ?ĂĐƌŽƐƐ
ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇůŝŶĞƐ ? ?Lende and Downey, 2012:  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/ŶƐĞĂƌĐŚŽĨ ‘ŵƵƚƵĂůĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ
seek a space in ǁŚŝĐŚ  ‘ďǇĐŽŵŝŶŐ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ǁĞĐĂŶĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƐ ŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?
(Lende and Downey, 2012: 24, 25, 51; see also Chiao, 2009; Roepstorff et al., 2010). But this account, 
while helpful, occludes some less admirable and upfront motivations for collaboration too  ? including, 
in the case of some of the authors on this paper, a half-understood desire to (however naively and 
simplistically) undermine some intellectual practice from the inside.  
16 
  
We draw attention to the fact that, amid a broader insistence on the generative ĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ? 
nature of interdisciplinary work, this was a collaboration whose fundamental goal was not only to 
make something new, or to solve a novel question. It was, at least in part, an attempt to undo a 
knowledge that already existed. For at least some of us, one of the core purposes of collaborating with 
neuroscientists was to render a more potent critique of (one area of) neuroscience. One thrust of our 




A third surprising feature of our experiment was a consistent sense of reserve, and even deception. 
This was apparent on several levels. Most obviously, it affected many of our collaborative interactions, 
ǁŚĞƌĞǁĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƐƉĞĂŬvery freely to one another  ? or criticize one another  ? to the point where it 
ďĞĐĂŵĞ Ă ďŝƚ ĚĞƚƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů ? dŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ƚŝŵĞ ǁĞ ƌĂŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ǁĞ ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ ƌĞĐƌƵŝƚ
anything like enough participants for a high-quality publication (maybe any publication at all). And yet 
still we turned up and proceeded, without anyone having called a halt, or without anyone 
remonstrating with anyone else, or without the group really conceding what a setback this was. This 
sense of tacit evasion, of not confronting things, even in the face of significant problems, was quite 
characteristic of our interactions. We will have much more to say about the effect of such 
equivocations below. But there was a more telling sense in which ours was a deceptive collaboration, 
which was  manifested in some of the ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĞƌƐ ? relationship to the practice of neuroscience 
itself. The fact is, although this was an fMRI experiment, we recruited the scanner only to the extent 
that it might betray its own limits; for some of us, the original design was set up to show something 
that fMRI could not do  ? i.e. that it would be induced to produce results that might bolster a case for 
arguing against the reliability of its measures and procedures more generally. There was a strong 
sense, then, in which this neuroscientific experiment only set the neuroimaging apparatus up to fail, 
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and in which some of us found a space to collaborate with neuroscience only by establishing this 
dishonest relationship with it. 
 And there was yet another sense in which this collaboration worked through moments of 
reservation and deception. We have already suggested that one of the most striking aspects of our 
senses of ambivalence and critique is that neither was ever really discussed among the group. And, of 
course, these sensations were not experienced by all authors, nor always to the same degree (not 
least for our collaborating neuroscientist, Dietz). But while there is not space, here, to more 
comprehensively illuminate what was specifically at stake for each collaborator, here we want to show 
how even the unwillingness to elucidate these differences corresponded to a broader sense of 
reticence or reserve among the experimenters, a feeling which, at its outer edges, drifted into a kind 
of muted dishonesty. For example, it is only in preparing this paper that some of the authors began to 
own up to their senses of ambivalence about the experience, a move that took others ďǇƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ ? ‘I've 
never felt any ambivalence in my involvement in [this] fMRI study ?, Dietz  pointed out when presented 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇŚĂĚďĞĞŶĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĨŽƌŚŝƐŽǁŶƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ‘All the work that 
goes into formulating the experimental design which embodies the scientific question we were asking, 
programming the stimulus sequence, analysing fMRI data, and, finally, drawing statistical inference to 
answer the questions we posed  ? it all offered new ways to extend my skills and rehearse the various 
aspects of cognitive neuroimaging. ?Clearly, the sense of ambivalence was felt more keenly by the 
social scientists and humanists than the neuroscientist here. We might locate this difference in the 
fact that the contemporary neurosciences are already made up of a host of (sometimes competing) 
disciplines and perspectives; there is a kind of multi-disciplinary cosmopolitanism inherent to the 
ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĞǁďƌĂŝŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŵĂǇŵĂŬĞƚŚĞƉƌĞƐŶĐĞŽĨ epistmeic difference, for the 
typical neuroscientist, a lot less jarring, and a lot easier to live with (Rees and Rose, 2004).   
 In any event, our point is not that there was a right or wrong way to feel about the study. 
Rather, our point is that as much as we kept what we were really doing from the participants, and 
from the laboratory machinery, we also, in some sense, kept it from one another.   
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Such experiences are hardly unique to our situation, and might even be trivial parts of ordinary 
research. But they nonetheless seem to run counter to what we are consistently told is good practice 
between disciplines. As Collins and his colleagues remind us, one of the core purposes of a 
ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝŶŐǌŽŶĞ ?ŝƐƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇƚŽƌĞƐŽůǀĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŽůůŝŶƐet al. 
(2008) provide a general taxonomy of communicative strategies within trading zones, from the 
formation of pidgins and creoles, to the enforced dominance of one mode, to the use of an 
interactional expertise as a linguistic communication device, and so on (p. 658- ? ? ? ? ?  ‘The idea of a 
trading zone as a place where problems of communication and co-ŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚ ? ?ƚŚĞǇƉŽŝŶƚ
ŽƵƚ ? ‘ĐĂŶŚĞůƉƵƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂǁŝĚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƐƚǇůĞƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞǁĂǇƐ
ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇŵĂǇĞǀŽůǀĞŝŶƚŽŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?Collins et al., 2008: 665). What, then, can one say about 
a scientific collaboration in which resolution takes the form of such reserve? What kind of 
collaborative and communicative zone is it, exactly, where ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐĂƐƐĞŵďůĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚ
fully believe in, and where they pretend to each other that everything is fine? We argue that 
transdisciplinary zones may not only be defined by creoles, pidgins, and trades, but also by forms of 
reserve, reticence and deception. Sometimes, people just want to keep things to themselves.    
 
The politics of experimental collaboration 
It is not our goal to unmask the transdisciplinary experiment. But we are interested in expanding the 
conversation about what is actually at stake in the daily experience of collaborative labour. Resisting 
both bureaucratic proclamations of why interdisciplinary is a good thing and technocratic attention to 
how it should be performed, our attention to the feeling of participation in these spaces brings 
another perspective into focus. In particular, our account of ambivalence and ressentiment leads us 
away from a straightforward epistemic or practice-based account of our experience, and towards an 
interpretation of the politics of experimental practice.    
Clearly, a macro-politics of knowledge structures interactions between the neural and 
psychological sciences, on the one hand, and the humanities and social sciences on the other. Scholars 
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from the humanities and social sciences are frequently exhorted to seek connection ǁŝƚŚ ‘ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?8  
but often with little reference to the political economies that have made humanistic and interpretive 
interests increasingly unsustainable.  ‘[T]he humanities are being driven into defensive positions ?, 
wrote the vice-provost of University College London recently.  ‘ĞƐƉŝƚĞŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-actions, they 
experience marginalisation as martyrdom and tend to look inwards rather than outwards to new 
possibilities, such as recovering their status and influence through interdisciplinary ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ?Worton, 
2013). In the background of this advice, of course, is the fact that humanities scholars are well advised 
to seek collaboration with the sciences because of many stateƐ ? radically different financial and 
rhetorical commitment to the two area(Browne et al., 2010; cf. Holmwood, 2011; McGettigan, 2013). 
This politics of knowledge was an implicit part of the design of our experiment, to the extent that, in 
effect, it recapitulated biologically a point that we already knew historically. This recapitulation was 
founded precisely on the recognition that a neurobiological claim is more rhetorically and politically 
potent than a historical one, even where the fundamental argument remains the same. It seems 
inescapable that much collaboration is similarly underwritten by cross-disciplinary differences in 
institutional power and epistemic prestige.  
Equally, in the ENSN ?ƐEĞƵƌŽ^ĐŚŽŽů ? despite clear desires for mutuality, ƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞƵƌĂů ?ǁĂƐ often 
unconsciously positioned as the thing to be understood, and the  ‘social ? a mildly querulous constraint 
upon it. Social scientists were introduced to magnetic resonance and the operation of the scanner; 
but there was no assumption built into the collaboration that social neuroscientists should learn 
something about science fiction, the machinations of power/knowledge, or anything similar. 
Littlefield, leader and originator of the study, was often asked about the history of lie deĐƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
experimental designs, and how these might be reimagined in a novel fMRI paradigm. But the flow of 
the experimental situation left little space for the numerous socio-cultural critiques that she leveled 
against the pursuit of lie detection through mechanical intervention. When the group collaborated 
around the pragmatics of the experiment, knowledges and tools got aligned in very specific ways.  The 
white board, for example,  was filled with  ‘2x2 ? factorial designs,  ‘x and y ? axes, and  ‘vectors ? of various 
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kinds; it never contained sociological or humanistic theories. There are, of course, straightforward 
organizational lessons to be drawn here (the humanists may well have simply disrupted such 
alignments). But we still draw attention to the fact that, even in avowedly transdisicplinary 
collaborations like ours, some knowledges have to interject, and to insist on their own usefulness; 
others have the privilege of taking their universal utility for granted.  
Such dynamics of exchange are clearly governed by a larger-scale epistemological politics, 
which renders methodological and conceptual differences between the social, natural and humanistic 
sciences as a hierarchy of intellectual prestige. Although this politics is well described elsewhere 
(Benneworth and Jongbloed, 2010; Philpott et al., 2011), it is strangely absent from the more formal 
and instrumental descriptions of  ? and sometimes exhortations to  ? cross-disciplinary collaboration 
considered above (Collins and Evans, 2002; Huutoniemi et al., 2010). By contrast, the re-consideration 
of this kind of scholarship at the level of mundane experience, through registers of feeling, and in the 
everyday pragmatics of transdisciplinary labour, brings these contests, and the politics that governs 
them, inescapably to the fore.  
 
Another politics of experiment is possible 9 
But there is more to be said about the relationship between experiment and politics here. Experiment 
is exhausted neither by ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŝƚƚǇ-ŐƌŝƚƚǇ ?ŽĨ ůĂďŽƌĂƚŽƌǇlife nŽƌďǇ ŝƚƐ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶĂƐĂ  ‘very peculiar 
human ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?; we can also think of experiments as aesthetic ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ĂƐ ‘ƚƌǇŝŶŐŽƵƚ  ? novel forms 
ŽĨŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? (Roepstorff and Frith, 2012: 105). We draw on this analysis of the experiment as a 
novel aesthetic gesture, in order to reposition the politics of experimental knowledge as it emerged 
within the ambivalent space of our collaboration. If the politics of our experiment derives from hidden 
machinations of disciplinary power and prestige in transdisciplinary collaboration, we are also in 
pursuit of ƐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?, understood as an ethic and a method that 
allows us to resist a straightforward account of disciplinary victimhood, and to re-state why we think 
it worth entering these spaces in the first place.  
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This experiment was not only an attempt at collaboration that proved (sometimes) 
surprisingly difficult. It was also a commitment to build on the work of other scholars already 
attempting to muddle through the sometimes troubling and awkward, but nonetheless ultimately 
productive, work of drawing an anthropological, sociological, literary-historical and neurobiological 
interest through one another (Roepstorff et al., 2010; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013; Singh, 2012; Wilson, 
2004). On the other side of the difficult relations of power and prestige that structure these kinds of 
collaborations, this experiment came from a gamble that there might nonetheless be an experimental 
space worth claiming, one in which novel political and epistemological frontiers would, at least, come 
into view. By insisting on such an  ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?in our collaboration, we try to grasp some of 
the ways in which this project was also an attempt to think with the experimental, in both its 
laboratory and aesthetic senses, as a mode of knowledge, one with particular kinds of constraints, 
effects and possibilities (Fitzgerald and Callard, under review). Drawing on feminist STS and allied 
areas, we root such a politics in a methodological refusal of sharp distinction between the objects that 
are given to, or the questions that can be asked by, scientific and non-scientific research-practices 
(Haraway, 1997; Latour, 1999). Precisely through such a refusal, we have pursued a transdisciplinary 
mode of intervention in which the neurobiological legibility of  ‘truth ?, for example, is not simply 
affirmed scientifically or critiqued sociologically; instead this legibility is expanded and complicated 
through more risky and generous imaginaries of cross-disciplinary connection, a method that works 
to figure, in this case, the traffic between lies, bodies, feelings, theories, situations, and laboratories. 
 Such an experimental politics relies on a sympathetic view of what neuroimaging either is or 
might be. In her Psychosomatic, Elizabeth Wilson (2008) ƌĞŵŝŶĚƐƵƐƚŚĂƚ ‘neurological material is more 
ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚ ?ĨůĞǆŝďůĞ ?ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐĞƌƚŝǀĞƚŚĂŶŵĂŶǇĐƌŝƚŝ ƐŚĂǀĞǇĞƚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ ? (p. 22). Such a 
material may even prove itself Ă ‘ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐĂŶĚ
inert substance against which criticism launches itself ? (Wilson, 2008: 29). By attending, here, to the 
flows of ambiguity, reserve, and even critique in our collaboration, and to their indivisibility from 
analyses of the experiment as such, we have similarly tried to show how a neuroimaging experiment 
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can be a more pliable, resourceful and self-aware mode of knowledge-production than many of its 
critics have yet realized (Choudhury et al., 2009; Martin, 2014). Several of us entered this experiment 
committed to a view that, beyond well-worn ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞƐŽĨ ‘ŶĞƵƌŽ-reductŝŽŶŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶĞƵƌŽ-ĐŽůŽŶŝĂůŝƐŵ ?
(Cromby et al., 2011; Martin, 2004) the neuroimaging experiment may harbour an untapped potential, 
one that might even claim neuroimaging laboratory as a site for forging novel alliances between 
biological, sociological and humanistic knowledges. We now interpret our awkward, and yet also 
sŽŵĞŚŽǁ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? as sign of how we have learned to live with such alliances  ? even 
where they are difficult, or unhappy  ? to assist more marginal modes of knowledge as they seek to 
become both say-able and witness-able. 
This pursuit of novelty, the forging of alliance, and the commitment to aesthetically 
experimental technique, is the frame, ultimately, through which we have come to understand the 
logics of ambivalence and reserve that flowed through our collaboration. Situating the linkage 
between neurological, humanistic and neurological knowledge as neither inevitable nor impossible, 
this experiment sought a space in which such connection might be actively configured. Our focus on 
feelings of discomfort and dishonesty illuminates the way in which such an experimental politics may 
require a rethinking of the logic of interdisciplinary collaboration, and the modes of sometimes 
temporary and uneasy circulation through which it gets practiced. We attempted to mobilize, in the 
experimental mode, something out of different bits of history, sociology, anthropology and 
neuroscience. And we are reminded that if such a composition is a difficult and tenuous achievement, 
it is an achievement all the same (Latour, 2010). Transdisciplinary awkwardness is neither simply a 
subterranean logic of collaboration (although it is partly that), nor is it only a reason for despair 
(although it is sometimes that too). But the reservations and ambiguities of our collaboration help us 
to re-imagine what an experimental politics makes possible in a collaborative mode. We believe there 
is scope for other inhabitants, from STS and elsewhere, to draw on, and to share, their own 




Conclusion: Practising equivocal speech 
Writing this paper brought our sense of ambivalence and reserve into the open. But even here we 
have not placed everything on the table. This paper itself, as an open process, was produced through 
a hesitant, electronically-mediated, iterative procedure in which one author, voicing their own 
reflections and feelings, asks others to comment, respond, add, or delete and so on. Such a process, 
which is not unique to us, is also governed by an ethic of reticent politesse. So we do not claim to have 
resolved the macro- and micro-politics of knowledge animated by that reticence. In this sense, the 
solidity of the connection between these reflections, and the deep-rooted thoughts, affects, and 
memories of the authors as such, must remain an open question. Conclusion, here, is not always 
closure. 
There are also other ways to account for our experience, not least to wonder whether our 
ambivalence is not simply a result of poor organization, and whether this paper should be interpreted 
as a call for more attention to method in the composition of projects like this one. We tackle some of 
these more organizational issues in an accompanying publication (Littlefield et al., 2014). But our 
experiment was also successful. We made a transdisciplinary hypothesis that drew on a literary-
historical insight in order to both trouble and expand a neurobiological literature; the experiment that 
we designed produced a positive publishable finding, in line with our hypothesis; we wrote that finding 
up together and we submitted it to a journal.  So we do not want to lament the feelings that 
accompanied our progress; nor are we minded to recommend ways to avoid our fate. Quite the 
opposite: our interest in dwelling on these feelings has to do with the fact that, unlike many others, 
our transdisciplinary experiment more or less worked out.  It is in this sense that we have suggested 
that good collaboration might be less a question of fair and transparent commerce, and much more a 
practice of learning to live with feelings of ambivalence and reserve.  
Let us return to Rabinow and Bennett. They should have known, they conclude, that  ‘the price 
to be paid for the power and instrumental mastery of modern science was the abandonment of 
hermeneutical meaning, general cultural significance, enhanced moral practice, and political or ethical 
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spirituality. We underestimated the existential price to be paid. ? (2012: 173). The scales and stakes are 
rather different between our collaborative endeavors and those of Rabinow and Bennett.  In both 
cases, however, social scientists and natural scientists were trying to do an actual, real, non-figurative 
'experiment'; collaborators found that one of their most significant results was a disappointing 
preponderance of disciplinary hierarchy. Rabinow and Bennett suggest a very particular kind of 
response; in the final pages of their monograph, they argue that their distinctively collaborative and 
critical orientation produces insights that need to be 'put into play in a serious and consequential 
manner ?, lest 'their salutary effects on the practice of thinking ... be deflated or distorted' (ibid.: 178). 
The ethnographers urge other would-be collaborators from the humans sciences 'to speak the truth 
frankly ... practicing frank speech in consequential situations actually makes one more capable of 
seeking the truth ? (ibid.: 179).  
 We want to conclude by suggesting a different kind of response. If our collaboration was not 
a great deal more comfortable than that of Rabinow and Bennett, it was Ɛƚŝůů ‘successful ?  ? at least to 
the extent that it ended with a more-or-less publishable shared result, within the loose remit of the 
ambitiously transdisciplinary framework it had set up for itself. Our proposal is that this success might 
have come precisely because we did not speak frankly; we did not seek the truth; we totally failed to 
acknowledge  ? let alone discuss  ? the consequences of our experimental situation. What we did, 
instead, was to try to work and live within a zone that was just about ambiguous enough to keep 
everything together  ? that was sufficiently averse to frank-speaking to keep the worst of the 
resentments at bay. We suggest that collaborators attend instead to an ethic of 'equivocal speech'  ? 
a mode that is attentive to the things that are better left unsaid, to the feelings that are as well off not 
articulated, and to the senses of awkwardness and ignorance that probably won't help anything if 
openly unacknowledged. Against ZĂďŝŶŽǁ ĂŶĚ ĞŶŶĞƚƚ ?Ɛ solution, and its imagination of a 
collaborative subjectivity founded on openness and speech, and precisely against the clarity and 
transparency demanded by frankness, our solution is rooted in the more nuanced equivocations of 
feeling. What we have tried to describe, here, is the capacity for, collaborating scholars, especially 
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from the social sciences and humanities, to feel ambiguity, and resentment, and subversion; but also, 
in particular, their willingness to go on feeling them; and their experimental desire to keep 
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dŚĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽ ‘ƌƵŶƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ
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session.  
6 This, too, was subterfuge  ? of course we would never publicly reveal results. But we wanted to make the 
situation cognitively taxing and a bit socially pressured. Participants were all given an individual restaurant 
voucher in lieu of this third meet-up that never happened. 
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